内容来源：https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q4-2025/

内容总结：

根据谷歌公司于2026年1月29日发布的2025年第四季度威胁分析小组（TAG）公告，该季度其平台识别并终止了多起涉嫌协同影响力操作的网络活动。

公告显示，相关行动主要针对违反平台政策的“协同虚假行为”。其中，数量最多的操作网络与中国有关。在持续调查中，平台于10月终止了3,715个、11月终止了105个、12月终止了6,280个与之相关的YouTube频道，这些频道以中英文发布涉及中美外交事务的内容。

此外，与俄罗斯相关联的操作网络被指规模较大且目标广泛。平台在三个月内累计终止了数千个YouTube频道、博客及广告账户，并限制了上百个域名的新闻推荐权限。其发布的内容涉及俄语、英语、法语等多语种，议题覆盖摩尔多瓦、亚美尼亚、乌克兰、北约及西方多国。

其他被指涉及协同影响力操作的国家和地区还包括印度尼西亚、巴基斯坦、阿塞拜疆、孟加拉国等。操作内容多涉及支持本国立场或批评他国。例如，与印尼相关的频道主要发布支持本国的内容；与巴基斯坦相关的行动则发布支持巴基斯坦并批评印度的内容。

谷歌在公告中称，这些发现与其过往报告趋势一致，并已依据平台政策对相关账户及内容采取处置措施。

中文翻译：

TAG 公告：2025 年第四季度
本公告包含我们于 2025 年第四季度在旗下平台终止的协调性影响力行动。本公告最后更新于 2026 年 1 月 29 日。

十月

• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 8 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享罗马尼亚语内容，批评摩尔多瓦。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 5 个 YouTube 频道和 1 个 Blogger 博客。该行动分享俄语和罗马尼亚语内容，批评摩尔多瓦。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 29 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享英语、法语、德语、西班牙语、阿拉伯语和俄语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评亚美尼亚、以色列、摩尔多瓦、乌克兰和西方。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 26 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享俄语和亚美尼亚语内容，批评亚美尼亚。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 4 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享俄语和罗马尼亚语内容，批评摩尔多瓦。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 1 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享德语内容，支持一个德国政党，批评欧盟。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 1 个 Blogger 博客。该博客分享俄语内容，针对摩尔多瓦选举，传播支持俄罗斯、批评摩尔多瓦某政党的言论。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 1 个 Ads 账户。该行动分享俄语内容，批评摩尔多瓦。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们禁止了 22 个域名在 Google 新闻版块和 Discover 上显示。该行动分享克罗地亚语、英语、法语、德语、意大利语、日语、马其顿语和俄语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评西方。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 1 个 YouTube 频道。该行动与互联网研究机构有关，分享俄语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评摩尔多瓦。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 1,054 个 YouTube 频道。该行动与一家俄罗斯咨询公司有关，分享俄语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评北约、乌克兰和西方。
• 作为对与巴基斯坦有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 1 个 Ads 账户。该行动分享乌尔都语和英语内容，支持巴基斯坦，批评印度。
• 作为对与印度尼西亚有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 445 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享印尼语内容，支持印度尼西亚。
• 作为对与位于英国的行为者有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 34 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享英语内容，支持一个英国政党，批评美国。
• 作为对与以色列有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 2 个 YouTube 频道和 1 个 Ads 账户。该行动分享英语内容，批评加拿大。
• 作为对与阿塞拜疆有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 387 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享阿塞拜疆语内容，支持阿塞拜疆，批评亚美尼亚及阿塞拜疆的批评者。
• 作为对与位于尼日利亚的行为者有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 8 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享英语内容，支持俄罗斯。
• 作为对与中华人民共和国有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 2 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享英语内容，支持中华人民共和国。
• 作为对与中华人民共和国有关的协调性影响力行动持续调查的一部分，我们终止了 3,715 个 YouTube 频道。该协调性虚假网络上传了关于中国和美国外交事务的中文及英文内容。这些发现与我们之前的报告一致。

十一月

• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 7 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享亚美尼亚语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评亚美尼亚和西方。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 31 个 YouTube 频道和 10 个 Ads 账户。该行动分享俄语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评摩尔多瓦和北约。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 20 个 YouTube 频道和 1 个 Ads 账户。该行动分享支持俄罗斯、批评以色列、乌克兰和西方的内容。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 226 个 YouTube 频道。该行动与一家俄罗斯咨询公司有关，分享俄语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评北约、乌克兰和西方。
• 作为对与泰国和越南有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 56 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享泰语内容，支持泰国。
• 作为对与印度尼西亚有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 799 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享印尼语内容，支持印度尼西亚。
• 作为对与印度尼西亚有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 27 个 YouTube 频道和 2 个 Ads 账户。该行动分享印尼语内容，支持印度尼西亚。
• 作为对与印度尼西亚有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 155 个 YouTube 频道和 2 个 Ads 账户。该行动分享印尼语内容，支持一个印度尼西亚政党。
• 作为对与印度尼西亚有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 138 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享印尼语内容，批评巴勒斯坦。
• 作为对与印度尼西亚有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 105 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享西班牙语内容，批评西班牙。
• 作为对与孟加拉国有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 64 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享孟加拉语和英语内容，支持孟加拉国。
• 作为对与阿塞拜疆有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 1 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享阿塞拜疆语内容，支持阿塞拜疆，批评亚美尼亚及阿塞拜疆的批评者。
• 作为对与中华人民共和国有关的协调性影响力行动持续调查的一部分，我们终止了 105 个 YouTube 频道。该协调性虚假网络上传了关于中国和美国外交事务的英文及中文内容。这些发现与我们之前的报告一致。

十二月

• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 4 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享英语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评美国。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 4 个 YouTube 频道，并禁止了 11 个域名在 Google 新闻版块和 Discover 上显示。该行动分享俄语内容，批评摩尔多瓦。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 4 个 YouTube 频道、4 个 Blogger 博客，并禁止了 2 个域名在 Google 新闻版块和 Discover 上显示。该行动分享俄语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评摩尔多瓦、乌克兰和欧盟。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 3 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享法语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评法国。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 3 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享阿拉伯语和西班牙语内容，支持俄罗斯和委内瑞拉，批评阿根廷和美国。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 29 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享亚美尼亚语内容，批评亚美尼亚、阿塞拜疆、土耳其和美国。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 2 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享西班牙语和英语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评乌克兰、美国和欧盟。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们禁止了 85 个域名在 Google 新闻版块和 Discover 上显示。该行动分享英语和法语内容，批评乌克兰。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们禁止了 18 个域名在 Google 新闻版块和 Discover 上显示。该行动分享英语、法语、德语、希伯来语、匈牙利语、意大利语、波兰语和俄语内容。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们禁止了 16 个域名在 Google 新闻版块和 Discover 上显示。该行动分享捷克语、英语和俄语内容，支持俄罗斯。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们禁止了 1 个域名在 Google 新闻版块和 Discover 上显示。该行动分享俄语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评欧盟。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 8 个 YouTube 频道。该行动与互联网研究机构有关，分享俄语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评摩尔多瓦。
• 作为对与俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 1,256 个 YouTube 频道。该行动与一家俄罗斯咨询公司有关，分享俄语内容，支持俄罗斯，批评北约、乌克兰和西方。
• 作为对与巴基斯坦有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 170 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享英语和乌尔都语内容，支持巴基斯坦，批评印度。
• 作为对与缅甸有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 8 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享支持两个缅甸政党、批评另外两个政党的内容。
• 作为对与印度尼西亚有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 2,584 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享印尼语内容，支持印度尼西亚。
• 作为对与白俄罗斯有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 10 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享英语、立陶宛语、波兰语、俄语和乌克兰语内容，支持白俄罗斯，批评欧盟、立陶宛、波兰和乌克兰。
• 作为对与孟加拉国有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 27 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享孟加拉语内容，支持一位孟加拉国民间社会领袖，批评印度和孟加拉国。
• 作为对与阿塞拜疆有关的协调性影响力行动调查的一部分，我们终止了 422 个 YouTube 频道。该行动分享阿塞拜疆语内容，支持阿塞拜疆，批评亚美尼亚及阿塞拜疆的批评者。
• 作为对与中华人民共和国有关的协调性影响力行动持续调查的一部分，我们终止了 6,280 个 YouTube 频道。该协调性虚假网络上传了关于中国和美国外交事务的中文及英文内容。这些发现与我们之前的报告一致。

英文来源：

TAG Bulletin: Q4 2025
This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2025. It was last updated on January 29, 2026.
October

• We terminated 8 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Romanian that was critical of Moldova.
• We terminated 5 YouTube channels and 1 Blogger blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Russian and Romanian that was critical of Moldova.
• We terminated 29 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic, and Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of Armenia, Israel, Moldova, Ukraine, and the West.
• We terminated 26 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Russian and Armenian that was critical of Armenia.
• We terminated 4 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Russian and Romanian that was critical of Moldova.
• We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in German that was supportive of a German political party and critical of the European Union (EU).
• We terminated 1 Blogger blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The blog was sharing content in Russian that targeted Moldova’s elections with narratives that were supportive of Russia and critical of a Moldovan political party.
• We terminated 1 Ads account as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Russian that was critical of Moldova.
• We blocked 22 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Croatian, English, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Macedonian, and Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of the West.
• We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to the Internet Research Agency (IRA) and was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of Moldova.
• We terminated 1,054 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of NATO, Ukraine, and the West.
• We terminated 1 Ads account as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Pakistan. The campaign was sharing content in Urdu and English that was supportive of Pakistan and critical of India.
• We terminated 445 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia. The campaign was sharing content in Indonesian that was supportive of Indonesia.
• We terminated 34 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to United Kingdom-based actors. The campaign was sharing content in English that was supportive of a United Kingdom political party and critical of the United States (US).
• We terminated 2 YouTube channels and 1 Ads account as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Israel. The campaign was sharing content in English that was critical of Canada.
• We terminated 387 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan. The campaign was sharing content in Azerbaijani that was supportive of Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics of Azerbaijan.
• We terminated 8 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Nigeria-based actors. The campaign was sharing content in English that was supportive of Russia.
• We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The campaign was sharing content in English that was supportive of the PRC.
• We terminated 3,715 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to the PRC. The coordinated inauthentic network uploaded content in Chinese and English about the PRC and US foreign affairs. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.
  November
• We terminated 7 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Armenian that was supportive of Russia and critical of Armenia and the West.
• We terminated 31 YouTube channels and 10 Ads accounts as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of Moldova and NATO.
• We terminated 20 YouTube channels and 1 Ads account as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content that was supportive of Russia and critical of Israel, Ukraine, and the West.
• We terminated 226 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of NATO, Ukraine, and the West.
• We terminated 56 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Thailand and Vietnam. The campaign was sharing content in Thai that was supportive of Thailand.
• We terminated 799 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia. The campaign was sharing content in Indonesian that was supportive of Indonesia.
• We terminated 27 YouTube channels and 2 Ads accounts as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia. The campaign was sharing content in Indonesian that was supportive of Indonesia.
• We terminated 155 YouTube channels and 2 Ads accounts as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia. The campaign was sharing content in Indonesian that was supportive of an Indonesian political party.
• We terminated 138 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia. The campaign was sharing content in Indonesian that was critical of Palestine.
• We terminated 105 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was critical of Spain.
• We terminated 64 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Bangladesh. The campaign was sharing content in Bengali and English that was supportive of Bangladesh.
• We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan. The campaign was sharing content in Azerbaijani that was supportive of Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics of Azerbaijan.
• We terminated 105 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to the PRC. The coordinated inauthentic network uploaded content in English and Chinese about the PRC and US foreign affairs. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.
  December
• We terminated 4 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in English that was supportive of Russia and critical of the US.
• We terminated 4 YouTube channels and blocked 11 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Russian that was critical of Moldova.
• We terminated 4 YouTube channels, 4 Blogger blogs, and blocked 2 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of Moldova, Ukraine, and the EU.
• We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in French that was supportive of Russia and critical of France.
• We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Arabic and Spanish that was supportive of Russia and Venezuela and critical of Argentina and the US.
• We terminated 29 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Armenian that was critical of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the US.
• We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish and English that was supportive of Russia and critical of Ukraine, the US, and the EU.
• We blocked 85 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in English and French that was critical of Ukraine.
• We blocked 18 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in English, French, German, Hebrew, Hungarian, Italian, Polish, and Russian.
• We blocked 16 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Czech, English, and Russian and was supportive of Russia.
• We blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of the EU.
• We terminated 8 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to the Internet Research Agency (IRA) and was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of Moldova.
• We terminated 1,256 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of NATO, Ukraine, and the West.
• We terminated 170 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Pakistan. The campaign was sharing content in English and Urdu that was supportive of Pakistan and critical of India.
• We terminated 8 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar. The campaign was sharing content that was supportive of two Myanmar political parties and critical of two other parties.
• We terminated 2,584 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia. The campaign was sharing content in Indonesian that was supportive of Indonesia.
• We terminated 10 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Belarus. The campaign was sharing content in English, Lithuanian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian that was supportive of Belarus and critical of the EU, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine.
• We terminated 27 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Bangladesh. The campaign was sharing content in Bengali that was supportive of a Bangladeshi civil society leader and critical of India and Bangladesh.
• We terminated 422 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan. The campaign was sharing content in Azerbaijani that was supportive of Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics of Azerbaijan.
• We terminated 6,280 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to the PRC. The coordinated inauthentic network uploaded content in Chinese and English about the PRC and US foreign affairs. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.